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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the concept of sovereignty and international
organizations is often posed as being problematic. The establishment and
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subsequent operations of international organizations are often character-
ized as involving the 'loss' of a State's sovereignty and as such have
been viewed with suspicion, if not antagonism, by certain domestic
commentators.' The response in legal journals by supporters of interna-
tional organizations has been too narrow, technical, and often simply
reaffirms the fears of the domestic commentators by focusing on how
the organization's exercise of powers constrains the State in the exercise
of its powers. The approach adopted herein is different. It involves a
focus on the essentially contested nature of the concept of sovereignty
and contends that this nature is the same whether sovereign powers are
being exercised on the domestic or international planes. This unity of
identity has two main consequences for our discussion of international
organizations: first, it provides a cogent reason for the existence of in-
ternational organizations; and second, it provides a rationale for the
construction of the normative framework that governs international or-
ganizations in the exercise of their delegated powers of government by
recourse, in part, to domestic public and administrative law norms.
II. SOVEREIGNTY AS AN ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Sovereignty as an Essentially Contested Concept
The precise meaning and scope of the application of sovereignty in
different contexts remains unclear. Stephen Krasner has provided a use-
ful typology of the concept, and yet there are still different ways of
approaching, giving content to, and using the concept. In addition to
domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal
sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty,2 the concept of sovereignty, as
the ultimate and supreme power of decision, can be both analyzed and
qualified from the perspective of what can be called its "contested ele-
ments:" such elements as legal versus political sovereignty, external
versus internal sovereignty, indivisible versus divisible sovereignty, and
I. This was, for example, the view of Republican Senate Leader Robert Dole who
considered that the US joining of the World Trade Organization would involve a loss of US
sovereignty. See John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Accep-
tance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157,
186 (1997). For an example of the exaggeration and rhetoric adopted in this debate, even in
academic journals, see Scott McBride, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Backbone of the
Global Trading System or Delegation of Awesome Power?, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 643,
644 (2001); and Mari Presley, Sovereignty and Delegation Issues Regarding U.S. Commit-
ment to the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Process, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 173 (1998).
2. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9 (1999).
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governmental versus popular sovereignty.' These elements of sover-
eignty have always been contested within polities and the outcome of
these contests at a particular point in time has established where sover-
eignty can be said to rest on a number of different spectra where these
contested elements represent points of extremity. However the specific
locus of decision-making within polities resulting from these contesta-
tions through history is almost secondary to the importance of
sovereignty as an essentially contested concept.! I am using here the no-
tion of an essentially contested concept as it is used in the philosophy of
language.' Samantha Besson provides a useful meaning of this notion
when she states: "[an essentially contested concept] is a concept that not
only expresses a normative standard and whose conceptions differ from
one person to the other, but whose correct application is to create dis-
agreement over its correct application or, in other words, over what the
concept itself is .... It is [the concept's] nature not only to be contested,
but to be contestable in [its] essence, so that not only [its] applications,
but also [its] core elements or criteria are contestable. 6 This is central to
sovereignty's contribution; that the very existence of the concept of sov-
ereignty generates continual arguments as to its core criteria. For
example: What are the conditions for the existence and exercise of sov-
ereignty? Who should exercise sovereignty and what form should these
entities take? These are but a few of the questions that the essentially
contested nature of the concept of sovereignty raises and will continue
to raise.
3. Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict: Post-sovereignty or Mere Change of
Paradigms?, in THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (forthcoming 2004)..
4. On sovereignty as an essentially contested concept, see Georg Sorensen, Sover-
eignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution, 47 POL. STUD. 590, 604 (1999);
and Besson, supra note 3, at § 3; and, importantly, for detailed consideration of how the
concept of sovereignty fulfils the three preconditions for a concept to be considered as being
essentially contested (the concept must be normative, intrinsically complex, and lacking any
immutable minimal criteria of correct application), see Besson, supra note 3, at § 4.
5. For the original promulgation of the idea of essentially contested concepts, see
W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCI-
ETY 167 (1956); and for its subsequent development and application in varying contexts, see,
for example, WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10 (3d ed.,
1993);John N. Gray, On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts, 5 POL. THEORY
331 (1977); John Kekes, Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration, 10 PHIL. &
RHETORIC 71 (1977); and Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137 (2002).
6. Besson, supra note 3, at para. 3.1. For a similar view, see Gray, supra note 5, at
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B. Sovereignty and International Organizations
The characterization of sovereignty as an essentially contested con-
cept has an important real-world manifestation in relation to
international organizations. The concept of sovereignty being inherently
unstable and in a constant state of having its core criteria subject to con-
testation and change has the consequence that there is no single, or
indeed authoritative, definition that can be given to the concept. This has
two important implications. First, it necessarily admits that the concept
of sovereignty can legitimately be contested in other fora and, for our
purposes, this includes international organizations that exercise con-
ferred powers of government. Second, it does not privilege conceptions
of sovereignty determined within States as opposed to those decided
upon within international organizations. As a matter of positive law
within a State, the decision of a particular domestic arm of government
in the exercise of its powers may of course be authoritative, but even
these decisions will be subject to contestation domestically and in the
case where States have conferred powers on international organizations
these may well be subject to contestation within these organizations.
The contestation of sovereignty within an international organization
has inherent within it causation that runs both ways between States and
the organization: States and their representatives contest conceptions of
sovereignty within an international organization, but this contestation on
the international plane inevitably affects domestic conceptions of sover-
eignty. 7 A good example of this is provided by the debate within the UK
on the constitutional basis of judicial review of Acts of Parliament for
their conformity with EC Law and whether indeed such review can be
justified by domestic interpretations of the constitutional relationship
between democracy and sovereignty.8
The fact that sovereignty is now being increasingly contested within
international organizations does not of course diminish the importance
of contestations of sovereignty on the domestic plane, even where an
organization has been given a binding power of decision in the exercise
of conferred powers. To the contrary, the contestations of sovereignty
that have been, and are still, occurring within Nation-States are often the
very same contestations that are now taking place within international
organizations. They are about the central problem of sovereignty: what
7. As Harold Koh has observed more generally: "Once nations begin to interact, a
complex process occurs, whereby international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and
become embedded in domestic legal and political processes." Harold Hongju Koh, Transna-
tional Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 205 (1996).
8. See Sir William Wade, Sovereignty-Reduction or Evolution?, 112 LAw Q. REV.
568 (1996); but see T. R. S. Allan, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revolution,
113 LAW Q. REV. 443 (1997).
1110 [Vol. 25:1107
The Essentially Contested Nature
are powers reserved to government; who exercises which of them; and
how should they be exercised? And it is largely for this reason that the
domestic arms of government seek to engage in the contestation of sov-
ereignty within international organizations that exercise governmental
powers.
Let us now turn to consider briefly how to fit what I have just called
the central problem of sovereignty with our general characterization of
sovereignty as an essentially contested concept.
C. The Nation-State as 'Exemplar'
An important element of W.B. Gallie's original formulation in 1956
of an essentially contested concept is that its contestation proceeds by a
process of imitation and adaptation from an "exemplar."9 Jeremy Wal-
dron has added an important and useful qualifier to this element when,
in a discussion of the Rule of Law as an essentially contested concept,
he states:
In Gallie's original exposition, essential contestability was asso-
ciated with the existence of an original exemplar, whose
achievement the rival conceptions sought to characterize and
develop.... But I am suggesting, now, that reference back to
the achievement of an exemplar may be too narrow an account
of what gives unity to a contested concept. Perhaps there is no
exemplar of the Rule of Law, but just a problem that has preoc-
cupied us for 2,500 years: how can we make law rule? On this
account, the Rule of Law is a solution-concept, rather than an
achievement-concept; it is the concept of a solution to a prob-
lem we're not sure how to solve; and rival conceptions are rival
proposals for solving it or rival proposals for doing the best we
can in this regard given that the problem is insoluble.'0
This approach is useful since it provides a constant touchstone for the
essentially contested concept in question, which brings those contesting
the concept always back to the reason for the concept's existence or, put
differently, back to the problem that the concept was in the first place
invented to try and solve. This does not in any way detract from the
9. Gallie, supra note 5, at 176-77. Compare Garver who states: "Gallie is right to say
that an exemplar can give unity to an essentially contested concept, but it can do so only
because an exemplar is a kind of essentially contested argument. It is not the fact that there
was a Roman Republic that gave unity to disputes about sovereignty in the eighteenth cen-
tury, but the fact that the Roman Republic [itself an essentially contested concept] was
appealed to and recognized as authoritative." Eugene Garver, Rhetoric and Essentially Con-
tested Arguments, 11 PHIL. & RHETORIC 156, 162 (1978).
10. Waldron, supra note 5, at 157-58.
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dynamic and lively contestation of the core criteria that arguably make
up a complex concept like sovereignty. But the identification of the cen-
tral issue does provide a general conceptual framework within which
these contestations can take place and, moreover, provides a basis for
distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant during contestation. What
then is the central problem of sovereignty about which there is continual
contestation? I have already suggested above that it is the following:
what are powers reserved to government; who exercises which of them;
and how should they be exercised? As such, the contours of the concep-
tual framework generated by this core problem clearly allow us to speak
of the concept of sovereignty within the context of international organi-
zations exercising conferred powers of government.
However, to dispense entirely with Gallie's notion of an exemplar,
as implicitly suggested above by Jeremy Waldron, may detract some-
what from the explanatory power of an essentially contested concept.
The obvious 'exemplar' in the case of contestations of sovereignty
within international organizations is the Nation-State. Instead, however,
of characterising the nation-State as an 'exemplar' it may be more accu-
rate to describe it as being a reference point since it does not provide the
desired end-point but rather the starting point for the contestation of
sovereignty within international organizations.
The contestation of the concept of sovereignty has always moved to
a more transcendent level of human institution: from the family unit to
the tribe to the City-State to the region to the institution of independent
and sovereign nation-States and now, finally, to international
organizations. The initial content of the concept of sovereignty to be
contested at each new, higher, level has usually taken as its starting point
of reference the position attained within the lower level. In this regard
the contestation of sovereignty on the international plane is no different:
the Nation-State is the starting point of reference for the concept of
sovereignty to be contested within international organizations. It is for
this reason in large part that the debate, for example, about the
legitimacy of the exercise by international organizations of
governmental powers (the so-called "democratic deficit") is largely
framed by reference back to the exercise of these powers within the
Nation-State." Moreover, as explained below in Section III, with
11. On the problematic issue of the lack of a democratic mandate for international
organizations exercising powers of government, there are at present two areas of proposed
reform to address this democratic deficit of organizations.
The first involves proposals for reform of international organizations. The most ad-
vanced and sophisticated proposals in this area relate to the European Community due to the
broad scope of the governmental powers being exercised by the EC that has stimulated a
substantial body of academic scholars writing in the area of EC institutional law. See, e.g.,
1112 [Vol. 25:1107
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Francesca Bignami, The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Les-
sons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States, Jean Monnet Working
Paper No. 5/99, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/99/
990501.html; Philip Craig, Democracy and Rulemaking Within the EC: An Empirical and
Normative Assessment, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/97, available at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnetl/papers/97/97-02-.html; Sverker Gustavsson, Reconciling
Suprastatism and Democratic Accountability, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 11/99, avail-
able at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/99/991101.html; Jean-
Claude Piris, Does the European Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?, Jean
Monnet Working Paper No. 5/00, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
JeanMonnet/papers/00/000501.html; Philip Norton, National Parliaments and the European
Union: Where to From Here?', in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 209 (Paul Craig &
Carol Harlod eds., 1998); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at
First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 524 (2001); J.H.H. Weiler, The State "iiberalles":
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/95,
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/95/9506ind.html;
J.H.H. Weiler et al., European Democracy and its Critique: Five Uneasy Pieces, Jean Mon-
net Working Paper No. 1/95, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/
papers/95/9501ind.html (Sept. 1995);Philip Raworth, A imid Step Forwards: Maastricht and
the Democratisation of the European Community, 19 EUR. L. REV. 16 (1994).
The second area of proposed reforms in order to address the democratic deficit of or-
ganizations is focused largely on States ensuring that their domestic political processes allow
for an input by parliament into the formulation of government policy on action within an
international organization. The legislative scrutiny processes which operate within several
States over proposed governmental action in, inter alia, international organizations may be
of some use here, even though it has not had a good record to date in terms of parliament
being able to exercise effective control over governmental action. For discussion of the pro-
cedures and practice of scrutiny carried out by national parliaments over their executive
governments when acting in the EC Council, see Laura Yli-Vakkui, Parliamentary Control
and Intergovernmental Agreements between the Member States of the European Union: Fin-
nish Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 301 (Martti
Koskenniemi ed., 1998); MAGDALENA M. MARTIN MARTINEZ, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 169-211 (1996). However, in respect of this scrutiny Mar-
tin Martinez concludes:
[I]n the great majority of European countries, Parliamentary control over the ex-
ecutive concerning community affairs has proved to be clearly insufficient. With
the only exceptions of Denmark and the United Kingdom, bodies within National
Parliaments specialising in Community affairs instead of exercising an "a priori"
control over the executive are simply "receivers" of ex-post fact[o] information.
They do not contribute effectively in the shaping of their Government's policy
stances on the Community.
Id. at 212. For criticism of the utility of this mechanism of accountability, see Stein, supra at
524.
To date, however, there has been a serious question whether a system of parliamentary
scrutiny and control over governmental action can ever be truly effective: thus, for example,
in the context of UK parliamentary scrutiny and control over the exercise of rule-making by
the UK government-a power which has been delegated by parliament to government. See
ROBERT BALDWIN, RULES AND GOVERNMENT 65-72 (1995); J. D. Hayhurst & Peter Walling-
ton, The Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation, in PUBLIC LAW 547 (A.W. Bradley
ed., 1988). But compare the relatively new and active House of Lords Select Committee on the
Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation which was first established in November 1992 and given a
permanent status in November 1994. On this Scrutiny Committee, see C.M.G. Himsworth, The
Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee, in PUBLIC LAW 34 (Dawn Oliver ed., 1995); and on the
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conferrals by States of governmental powers on international
organizations, the general starting point for the limitations on the
exercise of these powers are largely those that attach to the use of these
powers within the national polity.
This approach that the sovereignty of States is only the starting
point of reference for contestation within international organizations,
does not, it should be emphasised, mitigate the important role of States
as actors in contesting sovereignty within international organizations.
The lower level of government has in history always played an active
and important role as a safeguard against the capacity of the more re-
cently established, higher, level of government to establish and enforce
problematic conceptions of sovereignty. This is particularly relevant in
the context of global institutions where maintaining the system of na-
tional autonomy is so essential if the evils of excessive centralization are
to be avoided. The general point has been made by Martti Koskenniemi
in the context of statehood: "Statehood survives and should continue to
survive for the foreseeable future because its formal-bureaucratic ra-
tionality provides a safeguard against the totalitarianism inherent in a
commitment to substantive values, which forces those values on people
not sharing them." 2 This bring us then to the important question of sov-
ereign values.
D. The Normative Character of Sovereignty
and the Question of Values
The concept of sovereignty has always been associated with an enti-
tlement to exercise governmental powers in the internal and external
domain, but this has always been subject to sovereign values that have
conditioned its exercise. Put in more conceptual terms, sovereignty pos-
sesses an important normative character. As Samantha Besson observes
more generally:
As a normative concept, the concept of sovereignty expresses
and incorporates one or many values that it seeks to implement
in practice and according to which political situations should be
evaluated. These values are diverse and include, among others,
democracy, human rights, equality and self-determination....
Concept determination amounts therefore to more than a mere
description of the concept's core application criteria; it implies
work of the Committee of European Affairs of the Danish Parliament, see lb Martin Jarvad, The
Committee of European Affairs of the Danish Parliament (the Folketing), in LAWMAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 223 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998).
12. Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 407
(1991).
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an evaluation of a state of affairs on the basis of sovereignty's
incorporated values. Despite the rhetoric that currently domi-
nates political and legal analysis, the pervasive clarity of central
political concepts like sovereignty therefore remains a myth.
What lies behind the prima facie categorical use of these con-
cepts are not facts that should be established, but conceptions
and interpretations that should be evaluated and maybe
amended in order to account better for the values encompassed
by these concepts. It follows therefore that the determination of
the concept of sovereignty cannot be distinguished from the
values it entails and from the normative discussion that gener-
ally prevails about it.1
3
An early starting point for the concept of sovereignty focused
mainly on paradigms involving the formulation and application of such
statal values as exclusive control by a State of its territory and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other States.'4 Today, however,
through a process of contestation the concept in the Western liberal tra-
dition has arguably been broadened both to include other actors and also
to contain values such as legitimacy, autonomy, self-determination,
freedom, accountability, security, and equality that are core to a modern
conception. This is not a static or exhaustive' 5-and some may even say
accurate-list and indeed based on what I have said earlier it could not
be: it is continually subject to contestation and change. The point is
though that these, or indeed other, values do provide sovereignty with a
normative character which can be used to evaluate a state of affairs
within a society or, in our case of an international organization, between
societies.
To take Besson's work one step further, the incorporation of these
values as an integral part of the concept of sovereignty allows the argu-
ment to be made that the exercise of public powers of government can
only be considered an exercise of sovereign powers when they are in
accord with sovereign values, otherwise the exercise of public powers is
something entirely distinct from the exercise of sovereign powers and
13. Besson, supra note 3, at 4.1. For the normative character of essentially contested
concepts, see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 22 ( 3rd ed.
1993), and Waldron, supra note 5, at 149-50.
14. But compare the fascinating analysis of the period 1870-1914 in MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1870-1960 98-178 (2001).
15. Compare Joseph Weiler's proposed sovereign principle or value of 'constitutional
tolerance' within the EU: see J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism:
Europe's Sonderweg, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 10/00, Sec. III, available at
http://www. jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/001001 .html.
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can even be considered as a violation of sovereignty. As Michael Reis-
man has stated in relation to this limiting-but also implicitly
evaluative-characteristic of one of his proposed sovereign values:
International law is still concerned with the protection of sover-
eignty, but, in its modern sense, the object of protection is not
the power base of the tyrant who rules directly by naked power
or through the apparatus of a totalitarian political order, but the
continuing capacity of a population freely to express and effect
choices about the identities and policies of its governors. In
modern international law, the 'unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence' by the Smith Government in Rhodesia was not an
exercise of national sovereignty but a violation of the sover-
eignty of the people of Zimbabwe. The Chinese Government's
massacre in Tiananmen Square to maintain an oligarchy against
the wishes of the people was a violation of Chinese sovereignty.
The Ceausescu dictatorship was a violation of Romanian sover-
eignty.... Fidel Castro violates Cuban sovereignty by mock
elections that insult the people whose fundamental human rights
are being denied, no less than the intelligence of the rest of the
human race.16
This feature of sovereign values being an integral part of the concept of
sovereignty is of particular importance to our discussion of conferrals
by States of sovereign powers-which include the full range of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers of the State -"v on international
organizations, since in order for an organization to be said to exercise
sovereign powers then it must ensure that this is in accord with sover-
eign values. The practical consequence of this approach for international
organizations is set out in Parts III and IV below. This approach to sov-
ereign values does raise a potential problem though at one level, for the
internationalist, since so long as different societies possess differing ap-
proaches to these core values of sovereignty then a truly shared sense of
16. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 866, 872 (1990)(emphasis added).
17. See ABRAHAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 226-27 (1995); JAN KLAB-
BERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 91, 205 (2002); PHILLIPPE
SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 275 (Phillippe
Sands & Pierre Klein eds., 5th ed. 2001); Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213 (2002); David H. Anderson, Law-Making Process in the UN
System-Some Impressions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 23 (1998); and Thomas M. Franck,
Can the United States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International Regimes?, in DELE-
GATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND
SOVEREIGNTY 1, 4-5 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000).
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sovereignty-and the ability and legitimacy of an international organi-
zation to exercise sovereign powers-becomes problematic.'8 It is in
part this issue that led the German Constitutional Court to retain for it-
self the competence to decide whether the exercise by the European
Community of conferred powers are in conformity with German funda-
mental rights. But, to reiterate for present purposes, it is precisely the
stimulation of this kind of debate-what are sovereign values and how
are they to be reconciled in the case of conflict-which is the vital, and
indeed unique, contribution that is made by the essentially contested
concept of sovereignty. This understanding of sovereignty's role to-
gether with its important ontological function provide a cogent counter-
argument2° against those who advocate its abolition.
2
'
E. The Ontological Function of Sovereignty
The process of contestation of the concept of sovereignty involves,
in almost circular fashion, a set of ontological and legitimating
decisions. The first is ethical; deciding who We are: who is a friend, who
is an enemy, and who is a stranger. The other is metahistorical; where
we came from, how we became friends, how we got here, where we are,
and where we are going in the future. 23 It is obvious as such that the
concept of sovereignty is inextricably intertwined with identity and
history. But to put the point differently, the essentially contested nature
of the concept of sovereignty means that it continually generates
18. But maybe this is to overstate the actual position, since there would seem to be
identifiable commonalities that exist within 'world culture.' Katzenstein, Keohane, and Kras-
ner cite work by sociologists, led by John Meyer, who have demonstrated a large degree of
similarity in formal national practices relating to issues as diverse as censuses, social secu-
rity, education, and science despite significant variations in national socio-economic and
ideological characteristics. Peter J. Katzenstein, et al., International Organization and the
Study of World Politics, 52 INT'L ORG. 645, 675 (1998). For a similar approach, see Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1749, 1752-53 (2003).
19. MAASTRICHT TREATY 1992 CONSTITUTIONALITY CASE, Case Nos. 2 BvR 2134 &
2159/92, reprinted in THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NA-
TIONAL LAW: THE CASES 556 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., 1994).
20. Another argument in favour of retaining the concept of sovereignty is because of
its important role in the management of inequality between States. See Benedict Kingsbury,
Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 599 (1998).
21. See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND
NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999). However, even MacCormick's approach
to, and critique of, sovereignty seems dependent on a particular conception of sover-
eignty,see Hans Lindahl, Sovereignty and the Institutionalization of Normative Order, 21
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 166, 175 (2001), and as such he is engaged in the process of
contestation of the concept.
22. JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1995).
23. Id.
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discussion on, and contributes to the formulation, formation, and
identification with, the concept of a community. Sovereignty has been
used to constitute societies but also to exclude from societies. History is
replete with decisions that give identity to the We as opposed to the
Other by focusing on geographical or other perceived differences
between parts of humanity based on such factors as ethnicity, language,
tribe, and even, it must be said with a degree of ironic circularity,
nationality. This stimulation of ontological decisions by the essentially
contested nature of sovereignty poses, according to some, an inherent
conflict at the core of modern conceptions of the concept. Jens
Bartelson, for example, observes:
Man, as the hero of modernity, made the state out of conflict,
but out of the state inevitably arises a new state of conflict; man,
in his quest for sovereignty, has pushed the tragedy of his politi-
cal predicament out of his hands by making the Other the
condition of possibility of his essential sameness within the
state. From Rosseau on, early-modern strategies of peace have
no option left save to proceed by domestic analogy when it
comes to international transformation; at the same time, the dia-
lectic of conflict can only constitute harmony out of conflict by
the logic of sublimation; as Hegel remarked on the possibility of
a federative solution to the problem of transcendence: "even if a
number of states join together as a family, this league, in its in-
dividuality, must generate opposition and create an enemy."
Thus, it appears as if the modern promise of transcendence is
based upon an ontology whose inherent dialectic continuously
pours cold water on the hope of its immanent fulfilment.24
Is it possible that the next stage of contestations of sovereignty may,
ontologically, focus on the constitution of communities based on the
extent to which different persons accept and apply values as opposed to
differences based on, for example, tribe, ethnicity, and nationality? And
the next question is can international organizations provide such a forum
for the contestation and formulation of such values? 25 This emphasis on
24. Id. at 232.
25. This certainly seems to be the approach adopted-but only in part (a State still
must be 'European')-by the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe which
provides in Article 1(2) as follows: "The Union shall be open to all European States which
respect its values and are committed to promoting them together." Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, 2003 O.J. C 169/1, available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/
constitution/table/indexen.htm. Article 2 of the Draft Treaty goes on to provide: "The Un-
ion's values. The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common
to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-
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international organizations as an institutional forum for such contesta-
tions is important. It is useful here to borrow from Martti Koskenniemi
who states: "Today, the ascertainment of universal values remains a
search for compromise between conflicting value systems. In this politi-
cal struggle something like a formal, procedural state system helps to
prevent adherents to opposing values from resorting to corporal vio-
lence. 26
There is, however, an additional layer of complexity that exists in
the case of international organizations. The very existence of
international organizations as necessarily a forum for contestation may
lead to the solidification of conceptions of sovereignty within a State in
response to this Other. This may on the one hand seem to compromise
the contribution of that State and its peoples to the formation of a
common approach to an issue since it may have forced them to adopt,
sometimes prematurely, a position on an issue in response to its being
raised within the context of an international organization (e.g., the UK
'opt-outs' from various EU issues such as European Monetary Union).
But on the other hand the very consideration of an issue at the
international level requires a State to have to formulate its approach or
response to an issue (e.g. having to make up its mind; will it participate
in European Monetary Union) and even a decision not to participate
represents a contribution to the process of contestation of sovereignty on
the international plane. Such an approach to sovereignty exemplifies the
virtue encapsulated in the concept of unity in diversity. Peoples are free
to identify themselves as members of a community by virtue of their
acceptance of certain values, but what is often more important than the
actual content of the values is their common acceptance of a process of
contesting these values, thereby allowing the members of the same
community to place differing emphasis on the content of even the same
value.
discrimination." Id. This does not, however, mean that there are not significant problems with
this Draft Constitution and indeed with the EU's human rights policies. For a number of
important reform proposals to address these deficiencies, see Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler,
An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human
Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Philip Alson ed., 1999); and for more general
discussion of the EU's approach to human rights, see, for example, ANDREW CLAPHAM,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW Vol. I (1991);
Grdinne de Biirca, Fundamental Human Rights and the Reach of EC Law, 13 OXFORD JOUR-
NAL OF LEGAL STUD. 283 (1993); Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the
European Union, 7 EUR. L. REV. 125, 141-50 (2001); Koen Lenaerts, Fundamental Rights to
be Included in a Community Catalogue, 16 EUR. L. REV. 367 (1991); and THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 1995).
26. Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 397, 402
(1991).
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This emphasis on the essentially contested nature of sovereignty
does not discredit realist explanations. To the contrary, in the process of
contesting conceptions of sovereignty on the international plane it is
likely that more powerful States will be able to project their approach to
specific values to a much greater degree than will less powerful States.
A possible example of this is the US projection of the value of democ-
racy through the United Nations .
To summarize, the first claim being advanced is that the very exis-
tence of international organizations performs an important ontological
function since these organization's provide a forum, transcendental to
the State, where conceptions of sovereignty-and more specifically the
content of sovereign values-can be contested on the international
plane. This is, moreover, arguably a positive development since simply
transposing domestic conceptions of sovereignty onto the international
plane is not always appropriate and indeed on the international plane the
value may be developed more extensively than is possible at the national
level.
Let us now turn to discuss my second claim; that domestic public
and administrative law principles are prima facie applicable to the exer-
cise by international organizations of conferred sovereign powers.
27. This arguably occurred when the US pushed for the adoption by the UN Security
Council of resolution 940 which provided, in operative paragraph 4, as follows:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the Security
Council] authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified
command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facili-
tate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the
Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected Presi-
dent and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti,
and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit im-
plementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the
cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating
Member States.
S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR 1994, 49th Sess., 3413th Mtg., 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994),
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm. This decision by the Security
Council-which was directed at ensuring the return to power of the democratically elected
government of President Aristide-was especially significant since it may have even in-
volved China, for example, acting against its egoistic interest by not vetoing the Security
Council resolution that authorized military action to restore democracy-at the least a very
significant concession by the Chinese Government in the light of its recent history.
1120 [Vol. 25:1107
The Essentially Contested Nature
III. THE PRIMA FACIE APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC PUBLIC AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The contestation of sovereignty within a large number of States has
led to the development of values that, to varying degrees, impose con-
straints on the exercise of sovereign powers at the domestic level.
Consider, for example, the value of accountability. In most States this
value has come to be regarded as being inextricably interlinked with the
exercise of sovereign powers at the domestic level28 through a long and
arduous process of contestation, and the value is often reflected in con-
stitutional and other public law constraints on the exercise of such
powers. 9 The conferrals by States of their powers on international or-
ganizations free from the normative limitations that constrain the
exercise of these powers at the national level is to dispense with by the
stroke of a pen the limitations on governmental tyranny that peoples
have fought hard to win within their domestic polity. But more funda-
mentally, we recall from above that an international organization can
only be said to exercise sovereign powers when this is in accord with
their underlying sovereign values. The incorporation of these values in
domestic public and administrative law principles mandates in general
terms the application of these principles to the exercise by international
organizations of conferred sovereign powers.3° It is the governmental
nature of these powers that allows us to distinguish between the types of
domestic law that prove useful as a source of analogy. In particular, do-
mestic private law which regulates private rights and powers will not
28. Cf NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 25 (1999).
29. A possible reason why accountability for the exercise of governmental powers has
emerged as an important sovereign value is that it appears to contribute to the quality of
governance within a polity. See, for example, Adsera, Boix, and Payne who contend, based in
part on statistical analysis, that the quality of government hinges on the extent to which citi-
zens can make their politicians accountable for their actions. Alicia Adsera et al., Are You
Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government, 19 (2) J. LAW, ECON. &
ORG. 445 (2003).
30. See, for example, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice which has
had recourse by analogy to the domestic public law systems of EC Member States in order to
ascertain the relevant principle which should apply in particular cases; see TAKIS TRIDIMAS,
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 4 (1999); and Mariano J. Aznar-Gomez, The 1996
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and Non Liquet in International Law, 48 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 3, 6 (1999). For more general support for this kind of approach, see IAN BROWNLIE,
THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE FIFTIETH AN-
NIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 213 (1998).
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generally be suitable for transplantation to the law of international or-
.• 31
ganizations.
Conferrals by States of powers on international organizations often
affect, arguably even undermine, the separation of powers within States,
especially between the executive and legislative branches of government
since it is the executive branch which represents the State in the organi-
zation when decisions are being made concerning the use of powers that
may otherwise have been the prerogative of the legislature. This pro-
vides at least a partial explanation of why the German Constitutional
Court-the Bundesverfassungsgericht-in its Maastricht decision
sought to ensure that the German legislature (the Bundestag and
Bundesrat) exercised control over the content of the powers being con-
ferred by Germany on the EU by giving the legislature the competence
to specify by statute the powers being conferred." In this respect, the
view being advanced here that domestic public and administrative law
principles are of general application to the exercise by international or-
ganizations of sovereign powers is important, since it allows the
participation, albeit indirect, by domestic legislatures in the process of
contestation of sovereignty on the international plane. This participation
by domestic legislatures is of crucial importance if international organi-
zations-as an emerging additional layer of government-are to engage
in a deeper, and thus more meaningful, contestation of the concept of
sovereignty within their respective spheres of concern.
All of this, however, raises the key question: to what extent is it ap-
propriate to employ domestic public and administrative law principles
when constructing the normative framework that governs the exercise of
sovereign powers by international organizations? 3  The general applica-
bility of domestic public and administrative law principles to
international organizations does not, of course, mean that a State's do-
mestic legal framework governing the exercise of a power can be
considered to apply automatically to the exercise of the same or analo-
gous power by an organization. There are two reasons for this.
31. On the inappropriateness of applying private law analogies to international organi-
zations more generally, see R. Higgins, Final Report of the Legal Consequences for Member
States of the Non-Fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations Towards
Third Parties, in 66-1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 201 (1995), and
EVANGELOS RAFTOPOULos, THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW
OF TREATIES 201 (1990).
32. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE][Federal Constitutional Court] 89, 155 (438-
39), reprinted in THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL
LAW: THE CASES, supra note 19, at 554-56.
33. The general importance of this type of enquiry has recently been highlighted by
Sir Robert Jennings. See Robert Y. Jennings, The Spirit of International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 725, 727 (2003) (book review).
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First, when States establish an international organization they are
agreeing to be bound by certain common obligations which flow from
the treaty: as such, there cannot be a presumption that the treaty is to be
applied in a different way to member States depending on their domestic
public or administrative law systems and the way in which the conferred
governmental power or an analogous power is treated under these vari-
ous systems. A domestic public or administrative law principle is only
arguably applicable to the exercise by an international organization of
governmental power where this principle can be identified as applying
to the particular power within the domestic public and administrative
law systems of a number of member States, since only then can it be
considered as a general principle of law34 and thus a formal source of
law applicable to international organizations; 35 otherwise the domestic
law analogy can only be of gentle persuasive value.36
Second, the constituent treaty itself will specify certain competences
and institutional and other limitations which attach to the exercise of the
power in question, and these may be of such a nature that it is inappro-
priate to use a domestic law analogy. For example, it was by engaging in
this type of enquiry that Jackson and Croley found that WTO Panels and
the Appellate Body should not have recourse by analogy to the US ad-•• 37
ministrative law concept of judicial deference to agency decisions
34. A legal principle does not, however, need to be universally recognized to consti-
tute a 'general principle of law.' Maurice Mendelson, The Subjective Element in Customary
International Law, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 177, 191 (1995).
35. General principles of law, as a source of international law, are applicable to inter-
national organizations. See Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice 1960-1989, Part Eight, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 13 (1996); and HENRY G.
SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 833 (4th ed. 2003).
This approach assumes however that international organizations are subject more generally
to international law: on this, see Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between
the WHO and Egypt (WHO v. Egypt), 1981 I.C.J. Pleadings 72, at 89-90 (March 25, 1951);
and ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT
46(1994).
36. For exposition of the more general role of analogical reasoning in the context of
international law, see Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and
Character of Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
207, 210 (M. Byers ed., 2000); and, in a judicial context, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW 201-206 (1979).
37. In particular, the decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of Chevron USA
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) where the Court de-
cided that US Government agency interpretations of the Statutes they administer are to be
accepted by the US Courts as binding in certain cases. For comment on this decision, see for
example: Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (1990); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Non-
delegation Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 201 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference
to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L.
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when determining the scope or standard of review to be afforded na-
tional court decisions."
An example of a case where a domestic public law principle can,
arguably, be applied to international organizations is when ascertaining
the contours of the normative framework that governs an organization's
competence to sub-delegate its powers.
IV. THE SUB-DELEGATION BY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
Considerable attention has been paid in the literature to the issue of
the domestic competence of various States to confer powers of govern-
ment in the first place on international organizations39 and the related
REV. 301 (1988); and Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the
Regulatory Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 126, 132-33 & 144-46 (1992).
38. John Jackson and Steven Croley state:
In stark contrast to administrative agencies, GATT/WTO members are not specifi-
cally charged with carrying out the GATI/VTO. To be sure, members are
obligated to fulfil their responsibilities under the WTO Agreement. In that limited
sense, GATT/WTO members are charged with administering the GATT/WTO. But
no country or combination of countries was ever delegated the responsibility of
implementing the WTO Agreement in the way that administrative agencies are
charged with implementing their statutes. Countries party to an antidumping dis-
pute are not delegates whose technical expertise specially qualifies them to make
authoritative interpretive decisions. They are, rather, interested parties whose own
(national) interests may not always sustain a necessary fidelity to the terms of in-
ternational agreements. Thus, while there may well be reasons for panels to defer
to an authority's permissible interpretation of the WTO Agreement, expertise of
parties to a panel dispute is probably not among them. The same is true for the ar-
gument from democracy. Indeed, this argument cuts in the opposite direction from
Chevron, once transplanted to the GATT/WTO context. Unlike agencies, national
authorities that are parties to an antidumping dispute are not accountable to the
GAITI/WTO membership at large. GATI/WTO panels, not disputing parties, are
the membership's delegates.... The argument in Chevron that judges should defer
to the interpretive decisions made by those accountable to the citizenry's represen-
tatives simply has no analogue in the GATI'7/WTO anti-dumping context.
Stephen Crowley & John Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Defer-
ence to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 209 (1996).
39. On the competence of States to confer powers on international organizations, see
in the case of the US, Thomas Franck, Can the United States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty
to International Regimes?, in DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES
ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 1 (2000). See also Curtis Bradley, International Delega-
tions, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003);
Lori Fisler Damrosch, "Sovereignty" and International Organizations, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 159, 165-166 (1997); Michael Glennon & Allison Hayward, Collective Security
and the Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Na-
tions?, 82 GEo. L.J. 1573 (1994); David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty
Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L.R. 1697 (2003);
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issue of the "democratic deficit" (the need for legitimate governance) of
these organizations in the exercise of these governmental powers.40 Our
present enquiry though, is restricted to considering two different, inno-
vative, issues.
First, to what extent is it appropriate to apply the delegatus non
potest delegare maxim to the sub-delegation by an international organi-
zation of governmental powers? 4' This requires examination of two
preliminary issues: whether the delegatus non potest delegare maxim
can be considered to be a "general principle of law" recognized by
States in their internal legal orders, and thus a formal source of interna-
tional law which is applicable to international organizations; and
whether the reasons for the existence of the maxim in domestic constitu-
tional law provide a justification for the application of the doctrine
within the context of international organizations.
Julian Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems
with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L.R. 71 (2000); and John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the
Old Constitution: the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998). In the case of Germany, see Georg Nolte, Constitutional Im-
plications of German Participation in Treaty Regimes, in DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE
EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 261 (Thomas M. Franck
ed., 2000). In the case of France see Alain Pellet, A French Constitutional Perspective on
Treaty Implementation, in DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON
DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 39, at 279. For a useful summary of the domestic
constitutional requirements that need to be fulfilled for the conferral of powers to an interna-
tional organization in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and Romania, see
Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, Economic Analysis of Constitutional Law: On Constitutional
Processes and the Delegation of Power, with Special Emphasis on Israel and Central and
Eastern Europe, 3 THEOR. INQ. L. 207, 253-257 (2002).
40. See, e.g., Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse, This is my EUtopia ... : Narrative
as Power, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 767, 769 (2002).
41. The preliminary question which arises here is why would an international organi-
zation want to sub-delegate its powers in the first place. There are three reasons that may
briefly be put forward here.
The first is that it may be due to the lack of ability of an organization to carry out in
practice the mandate for which powers have been delegated. For example, in the context of
the UN and its peace and security mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security
Council has had to sub-delegate many of its powers in this area to UN Member States and
regional organizations simply because it has lacked the military capability to act to maintain
or restore international peace. The provisions of Article 43 of the UN Charter which were
intended to provide the Council with such a military capability have not been implemented
by Member States due to political reasons, and as such the Council has had to sub-delegate
its Chapter VII powers to UN Member States and regional organizations for military en-
forcement action to be carried out in practice. Secondly, it may even be an attempt by an
organization to transfer political responsibility for any consequences flowing from the exer-
cise of the powers in question to another entity. Cf infra note 59 and accompanying text
(discussing a purported transfer of legal responsibility). Thirdly, it may represent a sophisti-
cated attempt by Member States to regain control over the exercise of a power they had
initially conferred on an international organization.
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Only after having made these preliminary determinations is it possi-
ble to go on to consider our second issue of what limitations on the
"general competence"42 of an international organization to sub-delegate
does the doctrine prescribe as necessary.
42. Principal organs of an international organization do possess a 'general compe-
tence' to sub-delegate their powers. The existence of such a general competence as part of
the corpus of the law of international organizations was affirmed by the European Court of
Justice in, among others, the case of Meroni v. High Authority, where the Court found that
the High Authority could sub-delegate certain of its powers under the Treaty of Rome even
where the Treaty did not expressly provide for such a delegation. Case 9/56, Meroni v. High
Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 133, 151. See also the Opinion of the Advocate-General in this case
who acknowledges the existence of such a general competence in the context of international
organizations; Case 10/56, Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer in Meroni v. High Authority,
1958 E.C.R. 177, 190; the Koster case, Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fuir Getreide und Futtermittel
v. Koster, Berodt & Co.,1970 E.C.R. 1161; and K. Lenaerts, Regulating the Regulatory Proc-
ess: "Delegation of Powers" in the European Community, 18 EUR. L. REV. 23 (1993).
Moreover, the existence of this general competence is further substantiated by reference
to an analogous general principle of public and administrative law which exists in various
domestic systems of government. The general principle of law is that an organ of government
possesses a general competence to sub-delegate its powers, subject to constitutional con-
straints, to other entities. The status of this principle as a general principle is validated by the
fact that executive and legislative organs of government within a large number of States-
from both common and civil law systems-have the competence to sub-delegate their powers
to other entities. See, for example, the legal position in the following States: Australia, G.
Sawyer, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, NATIONAL REPORTS, pt. A, A-52 (V. Knapp ed.,
1971); Belgium, Rend David, Sources of Law, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL
SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
THE WORLD 3-52 (Rend David ed., 1984); Canada, see for example the case of Gavin v. The
Queen, 23 I.L.R. 154 (Sup. Ct. P.E.I. 1956)(Can.); France, see Article 38 of the 1958 French
Constitution, FR. CONST. art. 38, reprinted in S. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS
224-225 (1995); see also Xavier Blanc-Jouvar & Jean Boulouis, France, in INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, NATIONAL REPORTS, supra, pt. E/F, F-51, F-53, and B.
RUDDEN, A SOURCE-BOOK ON FRENCH LAW: PUBLIC LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW PRIVATE LAW: STRUCTURE, CONTRACT 24 (1991); Germany, see Articles 80
and 129 of the German Basic Law, Arts. 80 & 129 GG, reprinted in S. FINER ET AL., COM-
PARING CONSTITUTIONS 164, 198-199 (1995); see also Uwe Kischel, Delegation of
Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United States and German Law, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (1994); Greece, Charalambos Fragistas, Greece, in INTERNATIONAL As-
SOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, NATIONAL REPORTS, supra, pt. G/H, G-50; Iceland, Th6r
VilhjflJmsson, Iceland, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, NATIONAL RE-
PORTS, supra, pt. I, 1-2; India, P.K. Irani, India, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL
SCIENCE, NATIONAL REPORTS, supra, pt. I, 1-9; Ireland, Paul O'Higgins, Ireland, in INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, NATIONAL REPORTS, supra, pt. I, 1-64, 1-65 and
the Irish High Court case of The State (at the Prosecution of Brendan Devine) v. Larkin and
Others, 70 I.L.R. 110, 113-114 (High Ct. 1975)(Ir.); Italy, Mauro Cappelletti & Pietro Re-
scigno, Italy, in International Association of Legal Science, National Reports, supra, pt. I, 1-
94; USA, see, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 149-150 (2nd ed.
1978), and Kischel, supra; and Japan, see Yosiyuki Noda, Japan, in International Association
of Legal Science, National Reports, supra, pt. J/K, J-7; Y Abe, [Delegation to Local Gov-
ernments and Substitute Performance], 57 HORITSU JIHO LEGAL REV. 4 (1985); and Article
18 of the Japanese Import Trade Control Order, Final Amendment, art. 18 (1987), in Japa-
nese Notification of Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Procedures Relating to the WTO
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A. Application of the Non-Delegation Doctrine
to International Organizations
The delegatus non potest delegare maxim, or what is otherwise
known as the non-delegation doctrine, deals with the extent to which the
exercise of a power delegated to one entity may be sub-delegated by that
entity to another (the delegatee).4'3 As de Smith, Woolf, and Jowell state
in their work Judicial Review of Administrative Action:
A discretionary authority must, in general, be exercised only by
the authority to which it has been committed. It is a well-known
principle of law that when a power has been confided to a per-
son in circumstances indicating that trust is being placed in his
individual judgment and discretion, he must exercise that power
personally unless he has been expressly empowered to delegate
it to another.... It applies to the delegation of all classes of
44
powers ....
In US constitutional law the maxim has been used in two ways.
First, the courts have used it as a basis for invalidating delegations of
governmental power.4 ' This extreme approach has rarely ever been used.
Second, and much more commonly, the maxim has been used as an
element of statutory interpretation, leading, with other reasoning, to nar-
rower constructions of statutory authority than might otherwise be
derived. This has certainly been the recent approach of the US Supreme
Court when dealing with issues of delegation. 4' The Court has, however,
Committee on Safeguards, G/SG/N/I/JPN/2 (July 17, 1995), which gives the Minister of
International Trade and Industry the competence to delegate various powers to the Director-
General of Customs: contained in the Japanese notification of Laws, Regulations, and Ad-
ministrative Procedures Relating to Safeguard Measures to the WTO Committee on
Safeguards.
43. See John Willis, Delegatus Non Potest Delegare, 21 CANADIAN B. REV. 257, 257
(1943).
44. STANLEY DE SMITH ET AL., JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 357-
358 (5th ed. 1995).
45. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-433 (1935). However, in Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) it was only
Rehnquist, Justice who held that the Statute, in casu, violated the non-delegation doctrine.
46. Two examples suffice to illustrate the approach. In Nat'l Cable Television v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), the Court refused to read literally the Independent Of-
fices Appropriations Act of 1952 when it was applied to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) which sought to impose fees on community antenna television. The Act
prescribed that in deciding, among other things, to impose fees, "value to the recipient, pub-
lic policy or interest served" should be taken into consideration. The party seeking to
invalidate the provision, argued that the fixing of a fee that took into consideration public
policy or interests served could be regarded as a levying of taxes. See id. at 340-342. The
power to tax, it was said, is one of those essential legislative functions that Congress is not
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required that Congress stipulate clearly the objective for which power is
being sub-delegated or what the Court has called an 'intelligible princi-
ple.' As the Court in the case of Loving v. United States stated:
It does not suffice to say that Congress announced its will to
delegate certain authority. Congress as a general rule must also
"lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." J.
W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 72
L. Ed. 624, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928); Touby, 500 U.S. at 165. The
allowed to delegate. Id. The Court used statutory interpretation to side-step the issue when it
stated "[i]t would be such a sharp break with our traditions to conclude that Congress had
bestowed on a federal agency the taxing power that we read 31 U.S.C. § 438a narrowly as
authorizing not a 'tax' but a 'fee'." Id. at 341. The Court found therefore that it was unneces-
sary to reach the delegation question and that "the hurdles revealed ... lead us to read the
Act narrowly to avoid constitutional problems." Id. at 342. The Court went on to read the
challenged section of the Act as not relevant to the case. Id. at 343. In other words the Court,
by narrowly construing the fee so as not to be a tax, thereby avoided altogether the issue of
the validity of the delegation of powers.
A similar approach was adopted by the US Supreme Court in Industrial Union Depart-
ment, where the Court dealt with the question whether the delegation, under section 3(8) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, of the power to "assur[e], to the extent
feasible ... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capac-
ity" required the agency to find a significant risk of harm before making a rule. Indus. Union
Dept., 448 U.S. at 612. In doing so, the Court rejected the opposing argument made by the
government on the basis that otherwise "the statute would make such a 'sweeping delegation
of legislative power' that it might be unconstitutional .... A construction of the Statute that
avoids this kind of open-end grant should certainly be favored." Id. at 646.
This approach of the Court has been fiercely criticized by David Schoenbrod, The
Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1271-74
(1985). Moreover, Manning, in a critique of this narrow interpretative approach by the Su-
preme Court, states:
The nondelegation doctrine serves important constitutional interests: It requires
Congress to take responsibility for legislative policy and ensures that such policy
passes through the filter of bicameralism and presentment. The Court, however,
has been reluctant to enforce this doctrine directly, largely out of concern that ag-
gressive enforcement of that doctrine will hamper Congress's ability to exercise its
constitutional powers and will strain the Court's capacity to make principled
judgments about excessive delegations. Although the Court has chosen instead to
promote non-delegation interests through the canon of avoidance, this strategy
produces significant pathologies of its own.... [W]hen the Court departs from its
usual methods of interpretation to avoid a serious nondelegation question, it runs
the risk of departing from congressional commands in the process. If the aim of
the nondelegation doctrine is to force Congress to take responsibility for legisla-
tive policy, the Court's avoidance strategy defeats, at least as much as it promotes,
that constitutional objective.
John F Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. CT. REV.
223, 277. See also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1721, 1721-23 (2002)(calling for the abolition of the non-delegation
doctrine in all forms from the context of US constitutional law).
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intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the understanding
that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so
may delegate no more than the authority to make policies and
rules that implement its statutes. Field, 143 U.S. at 693-694.
Though in 1935 we struck down two delegations for lack of an
intelligible principle, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935), and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 446, 55
S. Ct. 241 (1935), we have since upheld, without exception,
delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms. See,
e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
216-217, 225-226, 87 L. Ed. 1344, 63 S. Ct. 997 (1943) (up-
holding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission
to regulate radio broadcasting according to "public interest,
convenience, or necessity"). Had the delegations here called for
the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond the tradi-
tional authority of the President, Loving's last argument that
Congress failed to provide guiding principles to the President
might have more weight. We find no fault, however, with the
47delegation in this case.
A similar concept of a non-delegation doctrine-which at a mini-
mum requires the stipulation of standards by which the exercise of sub-
delegated power can be evaluated-is applied to sub-delegations of gov-
ernmental power in a variety of States that represent both common and
civil law systems.4' As such, it is contended that the non-delegation doc-
47. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1996). For employment of this
approach by the Supreme Court, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457,472-75
(2001).
48. Uwe Kischel, when comparing the delegation of legislative power to agencies in
US and German law, finds five general points of agreement. Kischel, supra note 42, at 239.
First, the legislature cannot delegate as it pleases. Second, the legislature must provide the
administration with guidance on how to carry out their authorization to make rules. Third,
the existence of such guidance will be the standard by which to determine the legality of the
delegation. Fourth, the standard is not immutable but may depend on the field of law to
which the authorization pertains as well as on the possible impact of the regulations. Fifth,
certain core legislative functions, especially those mentioned in the respective constitutions,
cannot be delegated at all. Id. See also supra notes 45-47 and corresponding text (Applica-
tion of the doctrine in the US). For examples of English law cases where the non-delegation
doctrine was used to hold actions to be unlawful "because the effective decision was taken
by a person or body to whom the power did not properly belong," see WILLIAM WADE &
CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 349-350 (7th ed. 1994) . See also in the con-
text of English law: Mark Freedland, The Rule Against Delegation and the Carltona Doctrine
in an Agency Context, PUBLIC LAW 19 (1996); and David Lanham, Delegation and the Alter
Ego Principle, 100 LAW Q. REV. 587 (1984). For discussion of the application of the doctrine
in Australia, see also David Malcolm, The Limitations, if Any, on the Powers of Parliament to
Delegate the Power to Legislate, 66 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 247 (1992); and Marion L. Dixon,
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trine exists as a general principle of law and thus in formal terms is ap-plicbleto nt ratin l • • 49
plicable to international organizations. There are, in addition, two more
specific reasons why the non-delegation doctrine is applicable to inter-
national organizations.
First, the fundamental object and purpose of the doctrine is applica-
ble to international organizations. The object and purpose of the
delegatus non potest delegare maxim is to ensure that powers are being
exercised by the entity to which those powers have been initially dele-
gated. 0 The reason for this is that the naming of a person to exercise
power by the entity that initially delegates power involves an implicit
assumption that the person was chosen due to particular institutional or
other characteristics.51 In the US, this type of institutional approach was
used by the Supreme Court in the case of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha to strike down a "legislative veto" exercised by
the House of Representatives (a one-House legislative veto) over an act
of the Executive." The Supreme Court found that the exercise of a legis-
Delegation, Agency and the Alter Ego Rule, I1 SYDNEY L. REV. 326 (1987); and in Canada,
see John Mark Keyes, From Delegatus to the Duty to Make Law, 33 MCGILL L.J. 49 (1987).
In the case of France, see, for example, the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel: Cons.
Const., June 26, 1986, D. 1986, 61; in the case of Brazil, see INTERNATIONAL AsSOCIATION
OF LEGAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, NATIONAL RE-
PORTS supra note 42, at B-43-B-44.
49. On the applicability of general principles of law to international organizations, see
supra notes 34-36.
50. Thus Wade and Forsyth in the context of English administrative law state the fol-
lowing: "[a]n element which is essential to the lawful exercise of power is that it should be
exercised by the authority upon whom it is conferred, and by no one else." WADE & FOR-
SYTH, supra note 48, at 347.
51. This issue of institutional competence also arose in the context of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in a decision on a motion in The Prosecutor v.
Tihomir Blaskic, where the majority of the Appeals Chamber found that the Presiding Judge
or a Judge designated by the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber could conduct in camera
proceedings to examine documents that involved issues of national security in order to de-
termine whether the documents were relevant to the case and, if so, whether they should be
redacted for purposes of the trial. However, Judge Karibi-Whyte in dissent on this modality
of examination of sensitive documents states: "There is no provision of the Statute or Rules
which enables less than three members of the Trial Chamber to conduct all or any part of the
proceedings. It seems to me logical, and follows inevitably, that all the members of the Trial
Chamber must be involved in every decision in the proceedings before the Trial Cham-
ber..., where a Statute vests jurisdiction in a body, to be exercised as such a body without
limitation or qualification, the exercise of such jurisdiction can only be by such body as
constituted. The exercise of the powers vested in the body is not delegable to any member or
part of the constitutive body without express authorisation." Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic,
IT-95-14, Appeals Chamber Division of 29 October 1997, separate opinion of Judge Adol-
phus G. Karibi-Whyte, 10, available at http://www.un.org/ictylblaskic/appealldecision-
e/71029JTK.html.
52. Imm. Nat. Srvc. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982). On the way in which a legislative
veto over Executive action would previously have taken place, see Emily S. McMahon,
Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: Defining a Restricted Legislative Veto, 94 YALE
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lative veto in the case of Mr. Chadha-who was seeking to remain in the
United States-was "essentially legislative in purpose and effect."53
Having characterized the legislative veto as an exercise of legislative
power, the Supreme Court struck it down since it held that the lawful
exercise of legislative power could only be in accordance with the insti-
tutional processes stipulated by the Constitution-by a law passed by
both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President for her or his
signature or veto-and not, as took place in casu, by action of a pur-
ported one-House legislative veto.5 4 In the context of a sub-delegation of
power, this type of approach has been developed by Freedman who con-
tends that if a court were to conclude:
[T]hat the Framers regarded the proper exercise of a specific
legislative power as closely dependant upon the unique
institutional competence of Congress, the non-delegation
doctrine would prohibit Congress from delegating that power to
another. In these circumstances, the act of delegation would so
alter the manner of the power's exercise that the resulting
arrangement would no longer be compatible with the Framers'
reasons for vesting the power in an institution whose character
and nature are defined in the special ways-of political
responsiveness and broad based diversity-that those of
Congress are. The informing principle of institutional
competence as a guide to the constitutionality of the delegation
of legislative power thus focuses on the tension between the
L.J. 1493, 1494-95 (1985). On the Chadha case, see also Thomas M. Franck & Clifford A.
Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the Chadha Case, 79 AM.
J. INT'L L. 912 (1985).
53. Chada, 462 U.S. at 952. The US Supreme Court cited as evidence of the veto's
legislative character its alteration of the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch
and its determination of policy. Id. at 952, 954.
54. Id. at 955-58. This approach was, moreover, confirmed by the Supreme Court in
the Loving case where it stated:
By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the
Framers created a National Government that is both effective and accountable. Ar-
ticle I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and
voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive and delib-
erative lawmaking. See Chadha, supra, at 951. Ill suited to that task are the
Presidency, designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own
legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independ-
ent of direct electoral control.
Loving, 517 U.S. at 757-58.
Summer 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
nature of the particular power delegated and the character of the
particular institution chosen to exercise it.
5
Application of this concept of institutional competence to the law of
international organizations is validated by an understanding of the proc-
ess of establishment of an international organization. An international
organization is established by the negotiation, conclusion, and adoption
of a constituent treaty by States. The delegation of power to an organ of
an international organization is only after careful consideration by the
States which negotiated the constituent treaty. 6 In many cases the dele-
gation of power to a particular organ is due to its peculiar institutional
characteristics. Accordingly, the concept of institutional competence-
and thus the non-delegation doctrine-is arguably of general application
to international organizations. In the context of the sub-delegation of
powers by an international organization, this does not necessarily pro-
hibit such sub-delegations but it does impose limitations on this
57
process.
The final reason why the delegatus non potest delegare maxim is
arguably applicable to the sub-delegation of powers by an international
organization is the notion of accountability. An important reason for the
non-delegation doctrine is to ensure that the entity to which power has
initially been delegated remains accountable for the way in which the
power is being exercised." What is meant by this concept of
55. James 0. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 307, 336 (1976). This approach reflects more generally the scholarly concept of
'structural due process' or 'due process of lawmaking'. With regard to the application of this
concept to sub-delegations in the US and German Law contexts, see Kischel, supra note 42,
at 248-249. On the issue of due-process more generally, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, Law and Public Choice 118-131 (1991); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 269 (1975).
56. This idea was expressed in a different form by President Winiarski in
the Expenses case when he stated:
[T]he fact that an organ of the United Nations is seeking to achieve [one of the
UN's purposes] ... does not suffice to render its action lawful. The Charter, a mul-
tilateral treaty which was the result of prolonged and laborious negotiations,
carefully created organs and determined their competence and means of action.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 230 (July 20).
57. See infra Part IV.B.
58. See, for example, the statement by Justice Harlan in the US Supreme Court case of
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)(Harlan, J., dissenting in part); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, at 319, 323 (2000); and Michael C.
Doff & Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 429 (1998). For a consideration of the various attempts made to reconcile accountability
concerns raised by Congressional delegations of discretionary power to government agen-
cies, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331 (2001).
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accountability is that the delegatee remains politically and legally
responsible for the way in which delegated powers are being exercised,59
and thus the delegator has a legal basis to bring the delegatee to account
for the way in which the powers are being exercised. 60 This concept of
accountability already has application in the context of international
organizations since an organization is legally responsible under its
constituent treaty to its Member States for the way in which it exercises
its delegated powers,6' and this provides a legal basis for Member States
Barron and Kagan use an interesting variation of this accountability argument in the
context of US administrative law to advance the following cogent view when considering to
what extent should the courts defer to agency decisions:
We contend that the deference question should turn on a different feature of
agency process, traditionally ignored in administrative law doctrine and scholar-
ship-that is, the position in the agency hierarchy of the person assuming
responsibility for the administrative decision. More briefly said, the Court should
refocus its inquiry from the "how" to the "who" of administrative decision mak-
ing. If the congressional delegatee of the relevant statutory grant of authority takes
personal responsibility for the decision, then the agency should command obei-
sance, within the broad bounds of reasonableness, in resolving statutory
ambiguity; if she does not, then the judiciary should render the ultimate interpre-
tive decision. This agency nondelegation principle serves values familiar from the
congressional brand of the doctrine, as well as from Chevron itself: by offering an
incentive to certain actors to take responsibility for interpretive choice, the princi-
ple advances both accountability and discipline in decision making.
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT. REV.
201, 204 (2001).
59. As the Appeals Chamber of the UN War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via stated in respect of the powers of the UN Security Council:
Support for the view that the Security Council cannot act arbitrarily or for an ulte-
rior purpose is found in the nature of the Charter as a treaty delegating certain
powers to the United Nations. In fact, such a limitation is almost a corollary of the
principle that the organs of the United Nations must act in accordance with the
powers delegated them. It is a matter of logic that if the Security Council acted ar-
bitrarily or for an ulterior purpose it would be acting outside the purview of the
powers delegated to it in the Charter.
Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction), 105 I.L.R. 420, 432 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo.
1995).
60. This concept of legal accountability is more specific than that of accountability of
international organizations more generally for the exercise of their powers: on this broader
issue of accountability. See Malcolm Shaw & Karel Wellens, Report of the International Law
Association Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASsOcIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE 584, 596-601 (1998).
61. There are two more aspects of this issue of accountability of an international or-
ganization in the exercise of its delegated powers worth noting. First, it does not mean that
the international organization is accountable for the exercise of these powers only to those
States which took part in the establishment of the organization: the Negotiating States. A
Negotiating State is defined in Article 2(l)(e) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties as 'a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty.'
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333. The
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to contest the way in which delegated powers are being exercised by the
organization. But it is precisely the ability of States in practice to ensure
this accountability that is often compromised when an organization sub-
delegates its powers. This is to speak of accountability on the
international plane: the accountability of an organization to its Member
States. But what is just as, if not more, important is the accountability
for the exercise of governmental powers that a State owes to its people,62
especially if one adopts the approach that a State acts as an agent for its
61people on the international plane.
To return to our more general point and to conclude on this section,
the reasons underlying the delegatus non potest delegare maxim, and
thus the maxim itself, apply to the sub-delegation of powers by interna-
tional organizations. However, just as in domestic constitutional law the
application of the maxim does not necessarily, or even usually, prohibit
a sub-delegation of powers by an international organization, since there
exists a general competence of organizations to sub-delegate their pow-
ers. The application of the maxim does, however, impose significant
limitations on an organization's competence to sub-delegate powers.
B. International Organizations and the Restrictive Effect
of the Non-Delegation Doctrine
The application of the non-delegation doctrine to an international
organization arguably imposes a number of restrictions on the compe-
tence of an organization to sub-delegate its powers. First, an
organization may be prohibited from sub-delegating certain of its pow-
organization is accountable for the exercise of its delegated powers to all its Member States.
This of course includes States which joined as parties after it was established. Second, ac-
countability cannot be to individual Member States. The nature of the delegation of powers
by States to an international organization is such that States acting collectively decide
through the constituent treaty to confer powers upon an organization. Thus as States become
a party to the constituent treaty they decide to join other Members in delegating their power
to the organization. Accordingly, accountability for the way in which powers are exercised
by organs of an organization can only be to the collective of Member States. This may cause
difficulties when deciding how an international organization is accountable in practice to
Member States. The plenary organ of an organization may be of some use in this respect
since it contains the totality of membership of the organization and may thus represent a
convenient forum for the exercise of this accountability. However, whether the plenary organ
could exercise such a function in formal terms would depend on the constituent treaty of the
specific organization.
62. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435-
36 (1987).
63. Compare, however, the problem that many States governments are not democratic
or otherwise lack domestic legitimacy and thus there is a real issue of the extent to which the
State does in fact act on behalf of its peoples. See Philip Allott, The International Court and
the Voice of Justice, in FIFrY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 17, 28
(Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
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ers. Second, an organization can only sub-delegate broad powers of dis-
cretion subject to certain conditions. Finally, when powers are being
sub-delegated the limitations on the exercise of the power by the organi-
zation must also be imposed on the delegatee.
1. An Organization May Be Prohibited from
Sub-Delegating Certain of Its Powers
Whether an organ of an organization will be proscribed from sub-
delegating certain of its powers will depend on an analysis of its con-
stituent treaty. This exceptional case will exist where it is clear that
States delegated the power to the organization on the condition that it
would not be sub-delegated. This condition may be provided for in ex-
press terms or may be ascertained, by implication, where it is clear that
States delegated the power to the organization on the understanding that
it could be exercised only by a particular organ in accordance with the
stipulated decision-making processes of the organ. As Franck, for ex-
ample, has stated in the context of the UN:
To [sub-]delegate is sometimes advantageous; more often it is
simply unavoidable. On occasion, however, [sub-]delegation is
specifically proscribed. In the Cyprus case the Security Council
entrusted the Secretary-General specifically and personally with
the good-offices mandate. Thus although he has a Special Rep-
resentative in Cyprus, he himself has met frequently with each
of the parties or has brought them together to negotiate in his
presence. In the Rainbow Warrior case, too, he was assigned an
arbitral function in his personal capacity, which therefore could
not be [sub-]delegated. 4
2. The Sub-Delegation of Broad Discretionary Powers
The non-delegation doctrine requires that, in general, broad powers
of discretion should not be sub-delegated. It is contended that this oper-
ates as a general rule of the law of international institutions which
governs a sub-delegation of powers. The general rule was confirmed by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of Meroni v. High Au-
thority65 where the ECJ found that the consequences resulting from a
sub-delegation of powers are very different depending on whether it in-
volves clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can,
therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria
64. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS. IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 210
(1995)
65. Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 133.
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determined by the delegating authority, or whether it involves a discre-
tionary power, implying a wide margin of discretion.66 The court held
the following, "[a] delegation of the first kind cannot appreciably alter
the consequences involved in the exercise of the powers concerned,
whereas a delegation of the second kind, since it replaces the choices of
the delegator by the choices of the delegate[e], brings about an actual
transfer of responsibility.
67
In casu, the ECJ went on to find that the only lawful sub-delegation
of powers as authorized by Article 3 of the EC Treaty is that which re-
lates to clearly defined executive powers, the use of which must be
entirely subject to the supervision of the High Authority, the entity pur-
porting to sub-delegate powers.6 ' However, it was not the actual sub-
delegation of a discretionary power that was the concern of the court,
but the following: "To delegate a discretionary power, by entrusting it to
bodies other than those which the Treaty has established to effect and
supervise the exercise of such power each within the limits of its own
authority, would render that guarantee ineffective." 69 The problem was
that the High Authority could not under the terms of establishment of
the subsidiary organs exercise direct authority and control over them in
terms of being able to change their decisions. From the tenor of this part
of the ECJ's judgment it seems clear that if the High Authority had re-
tained the right to change the decisions of its subsidiary organs, then the
sub-delegation would have been lawful. 70 The rationale for this being,
66. In casu, the Court found that there were no objective criteria by which the subsidi-
ary organs could take decisions and accordingly that they had to exercise a wide margin of
discretion in carrying out the tasks entrusted to them by the High Authority. Id. at 154.
67. Id. at 152.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The Court states: "In reserving to itself the power to refuse its approval, the High
Authority has not retained sufficient powers for the delegation resulting from Decision No
14/55 to be contained in the limits defined above." Id. at 154.
Moreover, under UK law an otherwise invalid delegation of power to a private party
may be saved if the delegator reserves a power to review a decision. See DE SMITH ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 365; Ex parte Blackburn, I W.L.R. 550 (1976). The Court of Appeal held in
Blackburn that the power of review may be vested in someone other than the delegator pro-
vided that the body given the review power is one to whom the power could lawfully be
delegated. This latter part of the Court's judgment has already been applied in the UN con-
text. In the Application for Review case the International Court of Justice engaged in the
inquiry, and found, that the General Assembly had the implied power to create a Committee
which was established to review decisions of the Administrative Tribunal. Application for
Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J.
166 (Advisory Opinion of July 12). Similarly, within the US the presence of administrative
safeguards for the exercise of a delegated discretionary power has been held to be important.
For example, in the case of Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, the District Court for the
District of Columbia decided to uphold the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970 on the basis of the substantial and procedural safeguards the Act contained
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presumably, that if the High Authority had retained such a right then the
institutional safeguards inherent in its decision-making processes7 could
be said to have been effectively guaranteed since they could have been
brought to bear on a decision of the delegatee at the delegator's discre-
tion.
This point about the institutional decision-making processes of the
delegator being brought to bear, or at least having the potential to do so,
on a decision of the delegatee is thus of fundamental importance to the
legality of a sub-delegation of a broad discretionary power by an inter-
national organization.
3. The Limitations on the Exercise of a Power
Must Be Imposed on the Delegatee
The third restriction is that when an organ of an international or-
ganization sub-delegates a power, the limitations pertaining to the
exercise of this power that exist under the constituent instrument must
be imposed also on the exercise of the power by the delegatee. If this
were not the case then the organ of an organization would be purporting
to sub-delegate a power greater than that which it is given by its con-
72
stituent treaty.
This limitation was recognized and applied by the ECJ in the
Meroni case when it found that the purported sub-delegation of power
by the High Authority to two subsidiary organs was unlawful since the
obligations and restrictions which applied when the High Authority was
exercising its power to impose fines were not applicable when the
which were designed to prevent the administrative abuse of power. Amal. Meat Cutters v.
Connelly, 337 F.Supp. 737, 764 (D.D.C. 1971). Judge Leventhal especially emphasized judi-
cial review, congressional oversight, the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and previous and expectable future administrative experience in administer-
ing price controls that would lead to the development of more precise standards. Id. at 746-
63.
71. The importance of the decision-making processes of an organ of an international
organization as being part of its institutional characteristics has been emphasized by the
International Court of Justice in the Voting Procedure case. Advisory Opinion, Voting Proce-
dure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West
Africa, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7); see also the separate opinion of Justice Basdevant, id. at 82;
Judge Lauterpacht, id. at 108-13; Judge Fitzmaurice in the Namibia case, Advisory Opinion,
Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 285-86 (June 21).
72. This is a corollary to the principle that an organization cannot sub-delegate powers
which it does not itself possess. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 142
(1950); and SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 35, at 1688. This principle in turn derives
from the general principle of law nemo dat quod non habet: one cannot give what one does
not possess.
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subsidiary organs exercised the power. 3 The fact that the subsidiary or-
gans could take decisions which were exempt from the conditions to
which they would have been subject if they had been adopted directly by
the High Authority gave the subsidiary organs in reality more extensive
powers than those which the High Authority itself possessed under the
treaty. Accordingly, the court found that this aspect of the sub-
delegation of power was unlawful.74 To conclude on this point, an organ
of an international organization cannot sub-delegate a power without
imposing on the delegatee those limitations which the constituent treaty
stipulate as necessary when the power is being exercised.
To summarize, there are three main consequences of the application
of the non-delegation doctrine to the general competence of interna-
tional organizations to sub-delegate their powers. First, an organization
may be prohibited from sub-delegating certain of its powers. Second, a
broad discretionary power can only be sub-delegated when an organiza-
tion retains such a degree of authority and control over its delegatee that
it can change its decisions at any time. Third, when powers are being
sub-delegated the constraints that restrict the organization in the exer-
cise of the power must also be imposed on the delegatee's exercise of
the power.
These limitations operate in all cases where an international organi-
zation purports to sub-delegate its powers, and as such should be taken
into account by an organization when deciding whether, and how, to
sub-delegate its powers to other entities. They should also prove impor-
tant to States when debating issues of sub-delegation within the
deliberative organs of an organization and before international and na-
73. Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 133, 149. In particular, under
Article 15 of the ECSC Treaty the High Authority must give reasons for its decisions, but this
obligation was not imposed on the two subsidiary organs. Moreover, the decisions of the
subsidiary organs were not made subject to review by the European Court of Justice: a condi-
tion which applied to the exercise of power by the High Authority. Id.
74. As the Court held: "Even if the delegation resulting from Decision No 14/55 ap-
peared as legal from the point of view of the Treaty, it could not confer upon the authority
receiving the delegation powers different from those which the delegating authority itself
received under the Treaty." Id. at 150.
Moreover, as the Advocate-General had earlier stated in his Opinion in the case: "At the
very least, however, it is necessary to require that the guarantees laid down by the Treaty as
to legal protection shall continue to exist even in the case of delegation.... The High Au-
thority cannot evade those guarantees by leaving it to agencies to which powers have been
delegated to adopt in its own place the decisions .... " Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer
in Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 177, 190. Accordingly, the Advocate-General went
on -to state: "Thus the decisive element is whether the guarantees of legal protection to be
found in the Treaty also exist in the case of a delegation of powers." Id. at 194.
1138 [Vol. 25:1107
The Essentially Contested Nature
tional courts75 where the legality of such sub-delegations may be called
into question.
75. The difficulty that arises in the context of an international organization is that
there is not always a judicial forum to challenge the exercise by an organization of delegated
powers. On the more general issue of available remedies against international organizations,
see KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Cambridge
University Press)(2002).
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